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COMBATING TERRORISM AGAINST 
COMMERCIAL AVIATION
C. Kurt Zorn 
Indiana University
 G eneral concern about terrorism and sabotage
in the United States has grown in the 
aftermath of the sabotage of Amtrak in Arizona, the 
bombing of the federal office building in Oklahoma 
City, the bomb threat at the New York regional air 
traffic control center, and the bombing of the World 
Trade Center. A concomitant concern has developed 
with regard to the adequacy of security at domestic 
airports and in commercial aviation. Twice in a three 
month period in 1995 the Federal Aviation Adminis­
tration (FAA) increased airport security. In August 
1995, the FAA ordered heightened airport security 
procedures due to concern within the Clinton Adminis­
tration about the threat of more frequent and more 
deadly terrorist attacks in the United States.1 Then, in 
October 1995, the FAA once again increased airport 
security due to concern about the visit of Pope John 
Paul II, progress in the Palestinian and Israeli peace 
process, and the conviction of ten Muslim terrorists.
Concern with the security of commercial aviation 
reached an all-time high after the bombing of Pan Am 
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 
1988. This deadly act of terrorism prompted passage of 
the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (1990 
Act) which set a number of goals for the enhancement 
of commercial aviation security. In the early 1990s 
concern seemed to ebb as acts of terrorism against U.S. 
targets decreased only to be heightened by the events 
in Oklahoma City and the explosion aboard TWA 
Flight 800 in July 1996.: There was a realization that 
terrorists are finding targets in the United States more 
attractive and attacks on the traveling public were 
likely to increase.
Heightened commercial aviation security, while good 
for the safety of the traveling public, is not without its 
costs. Besides the direct costs associated with 
employing additional security personnel and equipment 
are the indirect costs-the opportunity costs-associated 
w ith the inevitable delays that accompany more careful 
screening of passengers and their luggage. Tighter 
security requires the traveler to allot more time to 
make flights because curbside check-in is not avail­
able, metal detectors are more sensitive leading to 
more false alarms, more luggage is searched, and gate 
agents are asking passengers more questions.’ The 
obvious question is whether the benefits gained from 
enhanced aviation security justify the costs.
During the first part of the 1990s strides have been 
made in the improvement of commercial aviation 
security in the United States. Despite these 
advancements, there is a lot yet to be done. This paper 
provides an overview of developments in commercial 
aviation security in the United States during the first 
part of the 1990s, discussing the accomplishments and 
setbacks encountered, and outlines the challenges that 
remain.
BACKGROUND
The FAA has responsibility for the safety and security 
of commercial aviation in the United States. The 
FAA’s approach to ensuring security in commercial 
aviation has evolved over the years in response to 
changes in the complexion and frequency of terrorism. 
The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 heightened 
concern about the security of commercial aviation to
Fall 1996 9
such an extent that Congress passed the Aviation 
Security Improvement Act of 1990.
The 1990 Act underscored concern about aviation 
security shared by Congress and the general public. It 
contained many mandates and directives for the FAA 
including:
• “FAA and the FBI were required to jointly assess 
the threats to and vulnerabilities of the nation’s 
airports
• FAA was required to review the security programs 
of foreign air carriers and approve those that 
provide a level of protection similar to that provided 
by U.S. carriers serving the same airport
• FAA was required to study the need for additional 
measures to safeguard the transportation of cargo 
and mail by passenger aircraft
• FAA was directed to support the acceleration of 
research to develop explosive detection equipment”4
It was hoped these measures would greatly improve 
commercial aviation security in the U.S. and 
throughout the world.
The Threat
Clearly the 1990 Act was a direct response to the Pan 
Am bombing and concern about increased terrorist 
activity against commercial aviation in the United 
States. Before discussing the progress the FAA has 
made toward the objectives set forth by the Act, it is 
reasonable to ask how real is the threat against 
commercial aviation.
It is important to understand what is meant by 
terrorism. A working definition of terrorism has been 
formulated by the Office and Technology Assessment 
(OTA). OTA defines terrorism as “... the deliberate 
employment of violence or the threat of violence by 
sovereign states or subnational groups, possibly 
encouraged or assisted by sovereign states, to attain 
strategic or political objectives by acts in violation of 
law intended to create a climate of fear in a target
population larger than the civilian or military victims 
attacked or threatened.”5
In truth, terrorist acts within the borders of the United 
States have been rare. For example, during the 1987- 
1992 time period there were a total of 38 terrorist 
incidents, another 31 suspected terrorist incidents, and 
24 terrorist acts that were thwarted. These incidents 
ranged in severity from relatively simple acts with no 
injuries or loss of life to significant attacks with 
injuries and loss of life. The incidents involved a 
variety of approaches including verbal threats, 
hijackings, explosives, and the use of incendiary 
devices. However, the acts tended to be on the more 
simple end of the continuum.
TABLE 1
Terrorist Activity in the United
States, 1987-92
Year
Terrorist
Incident
Suspected
Incident
Terrorist
Acts
Prevented
1987 9 8 5
1988 9 5 3
1989 4 16 7
1990 7 1 5
1991 5 1 4
1992 4 0 0
Total 38 31 24
Source: United States General Accounting Office, 
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet 
Domestic and International Challenges (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED- 
94-38. January 1994), Table 1.1, page 11.
During the past five years, there have been few 
incidents of terrorism against commercial aviation 
targets either in the United States or the rest of the 
world. The majority of terrorist incidents that have 
occurred have been targeted against the flag carriers of 
countries which have been experiencing a degree of 
civil unrest or upheaval. While commercial aviation 
recently has not been targeted by terrorists, the threat 
is always present.
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Traditionally the source of the threat to commercial 
aviation has been from explosives contained in checked 
luggage, carry-on baggage, and mail. There is grow ing 
concern that, as advances are made in detecting 
explosives in checked and carry-on luggage, terrorists 
may turn to more exotic devices as a way to achieve 
their objectives against commercial aviation. One such 
device is the handheld missile, a weapon that is 
becoming more common in the terrorist’s arsenal. Up 
to now, most missile attacks against civilian aircraft 
have occurred in areas of the world that have been 
experiencing insurgencies. During the 1978-93 time 
span, 15 of 26 attacks occurred in Angola, Sudan, and 
Afghanistan. These attacks were infrequent over the 
1978-93 time span, but their frequency has increased 
in recent years.6
TABLE 2
Incidents of Terrorism Against 
Commercial Aviation Targets
Year
TT^
Airlines
Foreign
Airlines
1990 1 39 (26 Aeroflot)
1991 1 24 (11 Aeroflot)
1992 0 12 (5 Ethiopian Airlines)
1993* 0 l (Lufthansa)
1994* 0 4
* Estimates.
Source: Air Transport Association Congressional 
briefing materials.
While the data suggest the threat to U.S. commercial 
aviation has not been severe, there is reason to be 
concerned about the future. The potential for terrorist 
activity in the United States is real, and many believe 
it is growing. The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) has detected an increase in terrorist “networking” 
and has identified a growing terrorist infrastructure. 
This infrastructure, which includes logistics support, 
equipment, training, and financial aid, is in place and 
ready to be tapped by terrorist groups. Both the FAA 
and the FBI believe that, as terrorist acts increase in 
the United States, airports and civilian aircraft will 
remain among the most attractive targets.7
A recent Department of Defense study on the future of 
terrorism highlights the concern for commercial 
aviation.8 Terrorists no longer seem satisfied with a 
few casualties; the trend is toward acts that cause mass 
casualties. The United States already is painfully aware 
of this trend toward more spectacular acts of sabotage. 
Terrorists will use all targets they consider vulnerable 
and appropriate; it seems logical that commercial 
aviation and the infrastructure supporting the air 
transport system in the United States will be targeted. 
Recognizing this threat, a lot of effort and money has 
gone into improving the security of commercial 
aviation in the United States.
DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMERCIAL 
AVIATION SECURITY
The Pan Am tragedy in December 1988 served as an 
impetus to focus attention on the current state of 
commercial aviation security. In direct response to the 
Pan Am incident, President Bush created the 
President’s Commission on Aviation Security and 
Terrorism. The Commission issued its 
recommendations in May 1990 and many of the 
recommendations were included in the 1990 Act. 
During this same time period, the Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) undertook a major 
study on the subject of using technology to combat 
terrorism. OTA undertook an in-depth look at a 
number of security issues including research and 
development of explosive detection devices and 
security at airports. A few years after the OTA study, 
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) released a 
series of studies that analyzed the current status of 
commercial aviation security and identified the 
challenges that remain.
The OTA Study
In 1989, a number of Senate committees asked OTA 
to investigate the status of research on technologies 
that could be used to protect the United States and its 
citizens from acts of terrorism. The study resulted in 
two separate reports. The first report dealt with 
research and development efforts on the federal level 
to counterterrorism, especially against commercial
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aviation, and the state of technology for the detection 
and prevention of attempts to introduce explosives 
aboard aircraft.0 The second report focused on 
integrated security systems and the human factors in 
commercial aviation security.10
Research and Development in Explosives Detection
Systems (EDS).11 OTA identified two general 
approaches to explosives detection that were being 
pursued by the FA A in 1991-bulk detection and vapor 
or residue detectors. One bulk detection approach, 
referred to as a nuclear method, relied on ionizing 
radiation to penetrate the object being studied. In 
1991, Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) was the most 
developed of the nucleartechnologies, but OTA felt its 
usefulness was limited.12 The other nuclear 
technologies were not promising candidates either 
because they required accelerators to generate the 
necessary active particles. Development of an 
acceleratorthat would be useful in a real world setting 
was a long way off.
A second method of bulk detection was the use of 
magnetic resonance and nuclear quadrupole 
resonance.nOTA did not believe this approach showed 
much promise in the near term. A third method of bulk 
detection was the use of x-ray technologies such as the 
backscatter x-ray and computerized tomography. 
Backscatter x-ray systems scan “a pencil beam of x- 
rays across an object and makes two images: the 
normal transmission image, created by a single detector 
on the opposite side, and a backscatter image, created 
by a large detector on the side of the entering beam.”14 
Computerized tomography is an adaptation of the 
medical CAT scan techniques. These methods of bulk 
detection seemed the most promising of the three bulk 
detection approaches.
The second general approach to explosives detection 
involved detecting vapors or residues left by 
explosives. These detectors could be as familiar as 
trained dogs or as advanced as technologies like 
chemiluminescence, ion mobility spectrometry, and 
bioluminescence.15
TABLE 3
Explosives Detection Technologies
Bulk detectors:
Using ionizing radiation 
Nuclear
- Thermal Neutron Analysis
- Fast Neutron Analysis
- Nuclear Resonance Absorption of 
Gamma Rays
- Associated Particle Production
- Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis
- Pulsed Fast Neutron Backscatter
- Nitrogen-13 Production with Positron 
Emission Tomography
X-ray
- Transmission
- Backscatter
- Dual or Multi-Energy
- Computerized Tomography 
Using non-ionizing radiation
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance 
Electron Spin Resonance 
Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance 
Vapor or residue detectors:
Dogs
Gas Chromatography 
(GC)/Chemiluminescence 
GC/Electron Capture 
Ion Mobility Spectrometry 
Mass Spectrometry (two-stage) 
Bioluminescence
Source: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: The 
Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), 
Table 4-2, p. 39.
Table 4 provides a brief overview of the strengths and 
weaknesses OTA found with some of the more 
promising EDS devices. OTA came to the conclusion 
that, after its review of the “...current state-of-the-art, 
[it] sees no evidence that any device, currently at the 
prototype stage, is capable by itself of reliably 
detecting small quantities of plastic explosives in 
checked baggage.”16 OTA defined “reliably” as a 
device that had at least a 90 percent detection rate and 
a false alarm rate that did not exceed 5 percent.
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Aviation Security.1 OTA made a number of 
recommendations with regard to aviation security. 
First, because no current or near-term technology 
appeared capable of providing the profiling and bomb 
detection technology needed to increase airline 
security, OTA concluded that an integrated approach 
which combined a number of different detection 
technologies would be preferable over one particular 
detection technology. This approach would allow the 
different technologies to complement each other 
because no one technology was able to provide the 
level of reliability required.
OTA did not recommend a specific configuration for 
the integrated approach. Instead it provided a 
conceptual outline of what the integrated system might 
look like. In the first stage of the system, passenger 
profiling and an advanced x-ray system would be used. 
When there was an indication that explosives were 
present additional scrutiny would be triggered. Stage 
two of the system would use a different technology, 
possibly vapor detection. Stage three would use a more 
elaborate and expensive device such as computerized 
tomography or TNA. OTA emphasized that the 
particular system used by an airport would be tailored 
to the specific needs and characteristicsof that airport. 
OTA thought determination of the optimal 
configuration for the system would be fairly easy and 
be dependent on things like peak passenger flow, 
required throughput rate (how many bags can be 
processed per hour), cost constraints, acceptable false 
alarm rate, and room (size and weight of the system).
The second recommendation that OTA made regarding 
aviation security was that more emphasis be placed on 
human factors in commercial aviation security. It noted 
that technology has its limitations and it was unrealistic 
to expect commercial aviation security to be totally 
automated. Therefore OTA suggested paying increased 
attention to passenger profiling.
OTA also underscored the importance of well-trained 
and highly motivated “screeners”-those individuals 
who operate the metal detectors everyone must pass
through before boarding a commercial aircraft in the 
United States. These security jobs require repetitive 
tasks and are boring because personnel are searching 
for a rare event-the presence of explosives or weapons. 
Acknowledging that a security system will only be as 
good as its weakest link, OTA suggested screeners 
receive better training and that EDS systems automate 
the boring and repetitive tasks as much as possible.
Third, OTA thought there was adequate promise in the 
field of aircraft and cargo container hardening to 
recommend further research and development. Air­
craft and cargo hardening would involve modifying 
cargo containers to absorb shock waves, prevent 
fragmentation, and to vent pressures; adding cargo bay 
liners to contain fragments; placing blow-out panels in 
the fuselage to control skin ruptures and tearing; and 
closing cavities and pathways between cargo con­
tainers and in the aircraft structure that have the 
potential of acting as conduits of shock waves.
Developments in the EDS Field 
Between 1991 and Late 1992
In August 1992 Heathrow airport concluded six weeks 
of tests on the modified Model 101ZZ backscatter x- 
ray system.18 Both the airport and developer seemed 
pleased with its performance during this operational 
test. It was estimated about 3,600 bags could be 
scanned per hour by the system and human inter­
vention was needed only if the x-ray detects an object 
with characteristicsof an explosive.
The FAA, in August 1992 altered its policy and began 
to allow airlines to voluntarily use enhanced x-ray and 
vapor screening devices to screen carry-on electronic 
items.1'1 Checked baggage could not be screened by 
these technologies because the FAA believed there 
were too many limitations associated with these 
technologies and their use might provide a false sense 
of security.
This new policy was met with a cool reception among 
airlines. The airlinesexpressed disappointment with the 
lack of attention and resources the FAA was devoting
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TABLE 4
Advantages and Disadvantages of Selected Explosives Detection Techniques*
Type Advantages Disadvantages
Chemiluminescence Cost; size; detects plastics; good at 
identifying particular molecular 
compounds
Slow; requires vapors or residues
Electron capture Very low cost; size; may detect 
plastics
Slow; requires vapors or residues; not good 
at identifying particular molecular 
compounds
Ion mobility Cost; size; may detect plastics Requires vapors or residues
TNA Detects plastics; no vapor needed Large; expensive; high false-alarm rates; 
inadequate sensitivity
X-ray, dual energy, or Cost and size relatively small; can see Not specific to explosives; questionable
backscatter other weapons; may see sheets or 
small quantities of explosives
sensitivity to small or thin quantities of 
explosives
Computerized Very high 3-D spatial resolution; good Not specific to explosives; looks only at
tomography for detection of small quantities density; slow; large; expensive
* A major concern with technologies that rely on the detection of explosive vapors or residues was the large 
amount of “background noise” created by the surrounding environment. In other words, the general atmosphere 
contains elements that are similar to those generated by explosives making it difficult to develop a vapor or 
residue detector that has the necessary level of sensitivity without a high false alarm rate.
Source: Adapted from U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism The 
Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), Table 5-1, p. 62.
to explosive detection system development. They 
pointed out while the FAA had been slow in evaluating 
and testing devices, European countries have been 
quite active. Over 52 Egis vapor detection systems had 
been ordered and 21 machines were already in 
operation at 12 European airports. In addition, airline 
officials expressed concern that the explosive detection 
systems under development would be very costly.20
The GAO Studies
The Aviation and Security Improvement Act of 1990 
required the FAA to have EDS in place by November 
1993. Despite a sizable increase in the FAA’s security 
research and development budget and the opening of 
the FAA’s Technical Center in Atlantic City, the FAA 
missed the deadline. In fact, it appeared the FAA was 
years away from meeting the objective. This prompted 
various members of Congress to ask the GAO to 
update them on progress with EDS. In addition, two
other requests for reports on subjects in the aviation 
security area were made.21
Explosive Detection Systems. The FAA has a central 
role in developing new security technology. To 
accomplish this objective the FAA “...(1) establishes 
performance standards for equipment, (2) selects the 
mix of technologies for development, (3) provides 
oversight and technical assistance to contractors, (4) 
tests equipment to ensure that it meets the performance 
standards, and (5) certifies (approves) the equipment as 
suitable for airlines’ use.”22 Obviously the FAA has a 
lot of responsibility and a huge amount of risk. 
Development of EDS involves new and untested 
technology and it is difficult to predict how an idea 
that is conceptually sound and works in a laboratory 
setting will perform under realistic testing conditions.
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Unfortunately, the FAA was not able to meet the 
November 1993 deadline set forth in the 1990 Act. In 
fact, there were no devices in operation at airports that 
had not been approved and in use before the Pan Am 
bombing in 1988. Compounding the problem, the 
FAA was unable, as of early 1994, to predict when an 
EDS capable of meeting its requirements for detecting 
sophisticated explosives in checked baggage would be 
approved. Technical difficulties were cited as the 
reason for the delay:
“As of December 1993, FAA had 40 research 
explosive detection projects, including 14 
prototype units, 4 of which are suitable for 
screening checked baggage. Our review of 
the development status of the 14 prototypes 
showed that 9 had been delayed-by 1 to 18 
months-because of technical problems. 
Furthermore, FAA has conducted laboratory 
tests on only seven devices; none fully meets 
FAA’s performance standards. FAA officials 
said that they expect to have five additional 
advanced prototypes available for testing in 
fiscal year 1994 but could not estimate when 
the new devices would be certified for 
industry use.”23
Another criticism leveled at the FAA was its failure to 
place much emphasis on systems integration when 
technology is approved for EDS use. While the FAA 
endorsed the idea that combining systems, as 
recommended in the OTA report, makes sense, it 
believed the task of integration should be left to the 
airlines. Because the airlines ultimately are responsible 
for the security of their passengers, the FAA suggested 
they were in a better position to assess their security 
needs and the needs of the airports they service.
The GAO found this line of reasoning faulty for a 
number of reasons. First, many potential software and 
hardware problems could be avoided if integration of 
systems is promoted from the very beginning instead 
of attempting to integrate after the technology is 
developed. Second, EDS technology most likely would
continue to evolve and the airlines may not be the 
correct group to ensure upgrades and improvements are 
made in EDS. Third, the FAA’s approach only seems 
logical if there are many competing technologies to 
choose from. This, of course, did not appear to be a 
reasonable assumption because not one device had 
been approved by early 1994. Finally, it is 
questionable whether the airline industry has the 
financial resources to conduct the research and analysis 
necessary for integration.24
Aircraft Hardening. Aircraft hardening began to 
receive a fair amount of attention by the FAA in 1992, 
receiving a dedicated research and development 
funding line in fiscal year 1993. The FAA and the 
early tests indicated it was feasible to contain the 
effects of explosions. Concerns remained about the 
cost, weight, and durability of the new luggage 
containers. Also, due to the size of the prototypes the 
hardened containers only could be used on wide-bodied 
aircraft. Wide-body aircraft only make up 29 percent 
of the aircraft worldwide while almost 75 percent of 
the bombings between 1971 and 1991 occurred on 
narrow-body aircraft.
Unless the weight and durability concerns with regard 
to blast resistant luggage containers are remedied, 
airlines most likely will not voluntarily replace worn 
out luggage containers with the more secure ones. If 
these issues cannot be solved, the FAA probably will 
have to mandate the containers.
Another facet of aircraft hardening is blast 
management. Blast management involves designing 
aircraft technology that will allow an aircraft to 
withstand internal explosions. At the time of the GAO 
report, little progress had been made in this area.25
The Certification Process.:6Another area that came 
under close scrutiny by the GAO was the process the 
FAA set up to approve explosive detection systems. 
One major criticism the GAO had with the process was 
its lack of operational testing. The FAA claimed 
operational testing would add both time and cost to the
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TABLE 5
FAA's Security RE&D Budget, Fiscal Years 1988-94 ($ millions)
Program 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Explosive Detection $9.6 $9.9 $17.0 $30.3 $27.3 $26.4 $22.8
Airport Security 0 0 0 $2.0 $4.2 $4.0 $2.5
Aircraft Hardening Program 0 0 0 0 0 $4.5 $7.8
Human Factors 0 0 0 0 0 $1.0 $2.8
Total $9.6 $9.9 $17.0 $32.3 $31.5 $35.9 $35.9
Source: United States General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic 
and International Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January 
1994), Table 3.1, page 41 and United States General Accounting Office, Aviation Security Development of New 
Security Technology Has Not Met Expectations (Washington, D C.: Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED- 
94-142, May 1994), Table 1.1, page 11.
approval process, things critics were already 
complaining about. In lieu of its own operational tests, 
the FAA was relying on contractors to perform 
operational tests.
There were a number of difficulties associated with this 
arrangement, according to the GAO. Contractors may 
not be conducting objective, realistic tests; they may be 
using a laboratory prototype instead of the final market 
model and the performance may vary dramatically 
between the two types of machines; most importantly, 
the FAA was not inspecting the testing conditions nor 
witnessing the tests, meaning it had no way to verify 
the contractors’ tests.
Another major criticism of the certification process was 
the lack of reliability standards for the devices being 
tested. In essence, the FAA could approve an EDS 
without having any idea how often the system would be 
out of service. The airlines expressed great reservations 
with this omission because of the effect unreliable 
security equipment could have on their performance and 
operations. The FAA countered that it was too difficult 
to develop reliability standards, and it would lengthen 
the approval process if it did. The GAO pointed out 
that other government agencies, such as the Department 
of Defense, routinely develop reliability standards for
new technology basing the standards on the operational 
needs of the department.
A third criticism of the approval process was the lack 
of performance standards for trace detection systems. 
As late as March 1993 the National Academy of 
Sciences, which was under contract to the FAA to set 
performance standards, reported it could not achieve the 
objective. The Academy cited the difficulty in 
distinguishing between“...very small tracesofexplosive 
material and much larger quantities of other materials 
in an airport terminal.”27
AccessControl.:x Access control has been an important 
component of commercial aviation security in the 
United States for a number of years. In 1989 the FAA 
passed stringent regulations governing access control, 
and the FAA has required more airports to adhere to 
the regulations over the intervening years. By August 
1994, 258 airports were required to “...(1) ensure that 
only authorized persons gain access to secured areas, 
(2) immediately deny access to persons whose 
authorization is revoked, (3) differentiate between 
persons with unlimited access to the secured area and 
persons with only partial access, and (4) be capable of 
limiting access by time and date.”29
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While these regulations seem to be a sensible 
component of an overall commercial aviation security 
plan, the cost of adhering to the regulations has greatly 
exceeded the FAA’s own cost estimates. Originally it 
was projected the costs to meet the regulations would 
be $211 million for the 1989-98 time span. More recent 
projections, which include actual costs already incurred, 
amount to $654 million for the 1989-98 period.’11 Not 
surprisingly, the costs of access control have been a 
major concern of airlines which must bear the Financial 
burden.
The reason for these greatly escalated costs, according 
to GAO, is the FAA’s lack of sufficient guidelines and 
standards for airports to follow while trying to adhere 
to the regulations. As a result, many airports have 
purchased access controls that provide a level of control 
significantly above what is required. Also, many 
airports contracted with vendors to develop hardware 
and software for access control systems and now are at 
the mercy of the vendors because the system is 
proprietary. In other words, many airports cannot “shop 
the competition" for maintenance or upgrades because 
there is no competition.
Similar Security on Domestic and International Routes.
The 1990 Act required the FAA to ensure a similar 
level of protection for U S. citizens traveling abroad as 
is provided to those traveling domestically. Inter­
national security standards generally are less stringent 
than the ones set by the FAA. The 1990 Act “...permits 
FAA to accept a foreign carrier’s security program only 
if FAA determines that the program provides a level of 
protection similar to that provided by U.S. carriers 
serving the same airports.”31 Despite passing regulations 
in 1989 that require foreign carriers flying to or from 
the United States to get their security plans approved by 
the FAA, there still exists a large discrepancy between 
security on domestic carriers flying international routes 
and foreign carriers flying the same routes.
The major stumbling block, according to the FAA, is a 
diplomatic one. The FAA believes many foreign 
governments would balk at the United States imposing
its standards on their countries’ carriers. In addition, the 
FAA argues that the emphasis should be on the airport 
the international carrier is flying from rather than the 
airline itself. Levels of security may vary widely on the 
same airline depending on what airport the airline is 
departing. Therefore the focus should be both on 
international airline security plans and on location. 
Obviously, this makes FAA’s task much more complex 
and more costly.
The Air Transport Association (ATA) is very concerned 
with the inconsistency in domestic and international 
security. While their primary concern is security, the 
ATA also is concerned about the competitive 
disadvantage created for domestic carriers by the more 
stringent security regulations. Table 6 outlines the 
argument fairly well underscoring the rather steep 
opportunity costs placed on customers of domestic 
carriers relative to customers of international carriers 
serving the same routes.
Recent Developments
In September 1994 it was reported the United 
Kingdom’s Transport Department had set late 1996 as 
a deadline for screening all baggage carried in the 
cargo hold of all international commercial flights.32 
This rule affects 50 airports in Great Britain. It 
requires airports either to inspect 100% of checked 
baggage by hand, subject all bags to conventional x- 
rays and search 10% of the bags by hand, or use an 
automated explosive detection system.
Airports in the U.K. have been taking the lead in 
improving the screening of luggage. BAA Pic., the 
private company that operates seven airports in the 
U.K. including Heathrow and Gatwick, just concluded 
an 18 month trial of a five-tier screening program at 
Glasgow airport in 1994. Results indicated that about 
80% of bags are cleared at the level one while the 
other 20% are sent on for further testing. Level two 
involved a combination of automated screening by dual­
energy x-ray devices and close inspection by a human 
operator. About 1 % of the bags originally checked 
required further screening past level two.
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TABLE 6
Differences Related To FAA Security Program
Foreign Flag
U.S. Airline Airline
1. Passenger processing at airport
* Security interview at point 
of baggage acceptance
2-5 minutes - all passengers Not Applicable
* Physical search of baggage 5-20 minutes - selected passengers Not Applicable
and carry-on items (sometimes conducted in special facilities)
* X-ray of baggage Required for all checked baggage Not Applicable
* Security questions at gate All passengers Not Applicable
* Total number of passenger 
processing points including 
immigration
4-5 2
* Total processing time prior 90-120 minutes average 20-30 minutes
to flight departure average
2. Airport terminal facilities
* Visible security barriers at 
check-in
Required Not Applicable
* Check-in counters Usually segregated in least accessible Prominent,
areas. convenient locations
* X-ray equipment Often cramped into check-in areas. Not Applicable
* Off airport check-in-rail Generally prohibitive due to security No Constraints
stations, cruiseships, hotels. requirements.
etc.
* Gate areas Sterile separation required. Passenger 
movement not
restricted.
* Aircraft parking locations May be limited by security requirements. Flexible
i.e., remote parking.
3. Aircraft Servicing
* Screening of service 
personnel
Required Not Applicable
* Cabin searches Required Not Applicable
★ Guarding of aircraft and 
cabin during servicing
Required Not Applicable
* Overnight parking Sealing and/or guarding of aircraft Not Applicable
* Catering and cabin 
supplies
Guarded and/or guarding of aircraft Not Applicable
* Aircraft turn times Longer serving time due to security, 
impacts aircraft utilization
Not Applicable
4. Cargo Special document and shipper verifications Not Applicable
Continued . . .
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Continuing TABLE 6
Differences Related To FAA Security Program
Foreign Flag
U.S. Airline Airline
5. Operational Performance
* Positive passenger bag Required Not required, some
match carriers conduct 
bag match on 
intermittent basis
* Offload of baggage for Required Several carriers
missing passengers require
* On-Time performance Impacted by above procedures Generally not 
impacted
6. Service Enhancements
* Advance check-in Clearance through security measures Service convenience
negates convenience of advance check-in can be offered with 
advance boarding 
passes
* Self-check-in and other Precluded from full benefit due to security No Limits
automation/" ticketless" requirements
service
* Expedite or premium 
service handling
Limited by security requirements No Limits
7. Customer Reaction
* Complaints Written, verbal complaints regarding 
inconvenience, intrusiveness, or even 
discrimination
Not Applicable
* Claims Claims or lawsuits regarding alleged 
harassment or discrimination
Not Applicable
* Choice of carrier Security measures cause passengers to Benefit from
avoid U.S. carriers customers diverted 
from U.S. carriers
Source: Air Transport Association, Congressional briefing materials.
The Egis explosive vapor detector was used for Level 
3 screening, and by the end of this level approximately 
99.9% of the bags checked were cleared. The 
remaining 0.1% of the total bags entering the 
screening system were hand searched in the presence 
of their owners. If an explosive was detected, the bag 
entered level 5 which consists of calling in explosive 
ordnance officials to deal with the situation.33
More recently it was reported that full-scale tests on a 
quadruple resonance EDS were commencing in 
London.34 The QSCAN-1000 can be used to inspect
checked luggage for explosives, producing either a 
pass or fail signal. Therefore, it does not require any 
operator interpretation of results. In a one-week field 
test at Los Angeles International Airport in late 1995, 
the QSCAN-1000 performed quite well.
While Great Britain and the rest of Europe continue to 
make progress in the testing and use of EDS, the 
United States lags behind. Rather than relying on 
operational testing like the U.K., the U.S. continues 
to rely on laboratory testing as the crucial step in the 
certification process. FAA’s use of this approach can
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be attributed to the requirement in the 1990 Act that a 
system must be certified before the FAA administrator 
can mandate its use. Not surprisingly, U.S. airlines 
are reluctant to voluntarily invest much time or 
resources in field testing an EDS that ultimately may 
not receive FAA approval. This means the FAA has 
little leverage to convince airlines to perform field 
tests.35
On December 9, 1994, the FAA certified its first 
EDS. The system certified was the CTX 5000 which 
“...uses transmission x-ray data to acquire an overall 
map of the objects in the luggage. It then positions 
strategic computer tomography slices to identify 
objects that may be explosives. The technical 
challenges of increasing the size of the scanner 
opening to accommodate large bags and engineering a 
constantly rotating (rather than reciprocating) gantry 
were solved, making it possible to scan passenger bags 
in seconds rather than the minutes previously required 
for a medical scan.”36 The certification was the 
culmination of more than nine years of research and 
over $8.6 million spent by the FAA.
The next step for the CTX 5000 is at least two 
operational trials at different airports and each lasting 
one year. The purpose of the trials is to help anticipate 
and solve some of the operational challenges that will 
be faced as the EDS is integrated into baggage 
handling systems. The FAA estimates it eventually 
may cost airlines around $500 million to install the 
CTX 5000 if the FAA chooses to mandate its adoption 
after the trials end in 1997.37
There has been some recent progress in the aircraft 
hardening area too. A container has been developed 
that can withstand the force of an explosion that is 
greater than the one that downed Pan Am 103 in 1988. 
Also, the prototype container addresses the airlines’ 
concerns with regard to maintenance and the weight of 
the container is close to the range deemed 
acceptable.38
CONCLUSIONS
While the threat against U.S. commercial aviation 
remains relatively low, the possible consequences of 
such an attack are frightening. The World Trade Center 
and Oklahoma City bombings highlighted the type of 
damage and casualties terrorists can inflict when they 
put their minds to it. It does not take much of a stretch 
to imagine commercial aviation is a tempting target for 
anyone bent on wreaking havoc and injuring many 
people with a single explosive device.
Since the Pan Am tragedy in 1988. a lot of attention 
has been focused on research and development to 
improve commercial aviation security. There has been 
progress but it has been slower than most anticipated 
General concern has been voiced about the disap­
pointing pace of EDS development and implementa­
tion. The FAA missed its deadline by more than one 
year, certifying its first EDS in December 1994 instead 
of November 1993 as required in the 1990 Act. Many 
reasons have been cited for this delay ranging from the 
FAA not directing the appropriate level of resources or 
attention to research and development to the daunting 
technological challenges it has faced in developing 
EDS.
Another major area of contention involves the 
integration of EDS. Despite OTA’s conclusion that an 
integrated approach is the only way to proceed and 
FAA's admission that this was the correct conclusion, 
the FAA is doing little, if anything, to promote 
integration. Instead, it is relying on the airlines, who 
are responsible for the safety and security of their 
passengers, to decide how best to achieve integration.
The experience with access control should be sufficient 
to convince the FAA it should re-think its approach to 
integration. Its failure to set standards and issue 
guidelines for airlines and airports to follow as they 
worked to meet the access control regulations has been 
blamed for the runaway costs of access control.
20 Journal of Transportation Management
Taking a similar “hands off’ approach to integration 
raises the probability that enhanced security will be 
more costly than it would be if the FAA took a 
leadership role.
A third area of concern is the fact that European 
countries seem to be way ahead of the United States in 
the field testing and utilization of EDS. Part of the lag 
can be attributed to the requirement in the 1990 Act 
that the FAA must certify a system before it mandates 
its use. Another contributing factor to the lag is that 
fact that airlines are responsible for security in the 
United States while the government generally is 
responsible in Europe. Airlines are understandably 
reluctant to take the lead in EDS development and 
testing due to the high degree of risk associated with 
the new technology.
Also, it is reasonable to believe there are economies of 
scale in security technology implementation. The 
implication is that a more centralized approach to 
security may be more cost effective. It is not difficult 
to imagine that one system designed for a particular 
airport makes more sense than separate systems for 
each airline serving a particular airport. In reality, 
security systems generally are designed for the entire 
airport, but the current arrangement requires lengthy 
negotiations among the airport and the airlines serving 
it to arrive at a security plan acceptable to all. It seems 
logical to vest the responsibility for designing an 
integrated security system with the airport 
management, encouraging them to coordinate with the 
airlines and the FAA. This approach may result in 
more risk taking with regard to the field testing of 
EDS, possibly closing the technological gap with 
European airports.
One thing is clear, enhanced commercial aviation 
security is costly. In the current budget-cutting 
atmosphere it is naive to think the FAA will receive 
additional resources to achieve its security objectives 
as quickly as most would like. Therefore, the FAA will 
have to continue to prioritize tasks meaning it will 
devote time and resources to particular security
objectives at the expense of others. This, in turn, will 
leave plenty of room for disagreement as not everyone 
will agree with the FAA’s priorities.
At some point, the question should be posed: “Do the 
benefits from increased security warrant the costs?” 
Congress is implicitly asking (and answering) this 
question as it revamps the welfare system, Medicaid, 
and Medicare. It only seems logical the same test 
ought to be applied to commercial aviation security. 
The ensuing debate should be quite interesting!
REFERENCES
1. “Flight Delays Are Expected to Worsen Amid 
Bomb Threats, Equipment Woes,” The Wall Street 
Journal, August 30, 1995, p. A3.
2. While the cause of the explosion has not yet been 
determined, there are indications a bomb or a 
missile may be the source.
3. Lisa Miller, “Security Alert: ‘Hurry Up and 
Wait,’” The Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1994, 
p. BIO.
4. United States General Accounting Office, A viation 
Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet 
Domestic and International Challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January 1994), p. 11.
5. U S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1991), pp. 16 -
17.
6. David Hughes, “FAA Examining Missile Threat.” 
Aviation Week & Space Technology> 139 (August 
16, 1993): 31-32.
7. United States General Accounting Office, Aviation 
Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet 
Domestic and International Challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January' 1994), p. 12.
8. David Hughes, “Pentagon Study Calls for 
Terrorism Review,” Aviation Week & Space 
Technology 142 (May 15, 1995): 33-34.
Fall 1996 21
9. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal 
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1991).
10. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technology Against Terrorism: Structuring
Security, OTA-ISC-511 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, January 1992).
11. This section draws heavily from U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Technology 
Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort, OTA- 
ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, July 1991).
12. TNA “...measures the presence of nitrogen by 
means of the interaction of thermalized neutrons 
(from a radioactive californium source) with the 
nitrogen nuclei. This interaction produces high- 
energy gamma radiation of a characteristic energy 
that is then detected.” U.S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, Technology’ Against 
Terrorism: The Federal Effort, OTA-ISC-481 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, July 1991), p. 40.
13. With magnetic resonance, a sample to be 
tested is placed “...in a uniform magnetic 
field and ... expose[d]...to a radio-frequency 
(RF) electromagnetic field. Then, the 
procedure requires varying the frequency (or 
the magnetic field strength) and noting the 
frequencies (or magnetic field strengths) at 
which the sample absorbs or emits RF 
energy. The nuclear quadrupole resonance 
method employs a similar procedure but does 
not require a uniform magnetic field.” U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal 
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991), 
p. 47.
14. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal 
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1991), p. 78.
15. A simple explanation of these technologies is not
possible. For a complete explanation see U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Technology' Against Terrorism: The Federal
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1991). pp. 81 - 
86.
16. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal
Effort, OTA-ISC-481 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, July 1991), p. 61.
17. This section draws heavily from U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Technology 
Against Terrorism: Structuring Security, OTA- 
ISC-51 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, January 1992).
18. “BackscatterX-rayExplosives DetectorCompletes 
Tests on Heathrow Baggage,” Aviation Week & 
Space Technology 137 (August 10, 1992): 35.
19. Edward L. McKenna, “FAA Permits Operational 
Testing of Advanced Explosive Detectors,” 
Aviation Week & Space Technology’ 137 (August 
17, 1992): 39.
20. Christopher P. Fotos, “Bomb Detection Shows 
Promise Despite Growing Cost Concerns,” 
Aviation Week & Space Technology 137 
(November 23, 1992): 76,78.
21. The first report addressed what actions must be 
taken to meet domestic and international aviation 
security challenges. The second report discussed 
the progress in development of new security 
technology and the challenges facing the FAA. A 
third report, issued in March 1995 analyzed the 
issue of how airport access systems could be 
made cost-effective.
22. United States General AccountingOffice,4v/a//o/7
Security: Development of New Security’
Technology’ Has Not Met Expectations 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 10.
22 Journal of Transportation Management
23. United StatesGeneral AccountingOfflce,/fv/ar/o«
Security: Development of New Security
Technology Has Not Met Expectations
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 18.
24. United States General Accounting Office, A viation
Security: Development of New Security
Technology Has Not Met Expectations
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 38.
25. United States General Accounting Office, Aviation
Security: Development of New Security
Technology Has Not Met Expectations
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994).
26. This section draws heavily from United States 
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security': 
Development of New Security Technology’ Has Not 
Met Expectations (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Accounting Office, GAO/RCED-94- 
142, May 1994).
27. United States General AccountingOffice,/lv/ar/on
Security: Development of New Security
Technology Has Not Met Expectations
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-142, May 1994), p. 35.
28. This section draws heavily on United States
General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: 
FA A Can Help Ensure That Airports’ Access 
Control Systems Are Cost-Effective, (Washington, 
DC.: Government Accounting Office,
GAO/RCED-95-25, March 1995).
29. United States General AccountingOffice,/lv/at/o/7 
Security: FA A Can Help Ensure That Airports’ 
Access Control Systems Are Cost-Effective, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-95-25, March 1995), p. 3.
30. Both projections are in constant 1993 dollars. 
United States General Account ing Office, A viation 
Security: FAA Can Help Ensure That A irports ’ 
Access Control Systems Are Cost-Effective 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-95-25, March 1995), p. 24.
31. United States General AccountingOffice,^v/c7//on 
Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet 
Domestic and International Challenges 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting 
Office, GAO/RCED-94-38, January 1994), p. 21.
32. David Hughes, “U.K., U.S. Pursue Baggage 
Screening,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 
141 (September 5, 1994): 74, 83.
33. David Hughes, “U.K., U.S. Pursue Baggage 
Screening,” Aviation Week & Space Technology 
141 (September 5, 1994): 74.
34. Michael O. Lavitt, “Luggage Inspection System 
Uses Resonance Technology,” Aviation Week & 
Space Technology 144 (February 5, 1996): 92-93.
35. Edward L. McKenna, “FAA Permits Operational 
Testing of Advanced Explosive Detectors,” 
Aviation Week & Space Technology 137 (August 
17, 1992): 39.
36. “FAA News Fact Sheet,” December 20, 1994.
37. Aviation Daily, Wednesday December 21, 1994.
38. “New Luggage Container Withstands Big Blasts,” 
Aviation Week& Space Technology 144 (February 
5, 1996): 92.
Fall 1996 23
